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1. INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IHL AND EMOTIONS 
 
Emotions are an intrinsic element of warfare: pride and patriotism may motivate soldiers to 
fight, the hope for independence may lead armed groups to violent resistance, a victory may 
lead to joy and relief, while the loss of lives definitely causes tremendous suffering among 
victims. Law, on the other hand, attempts to offer objective rules to regulate human 
interaction, including warfare.1 This is also true for international humanitarian law (IHL), a 
body of international law aimed at reducing the suffering of victims of armed conflict.2 
However, despite the fact that IHL consists of objective legal rules, IHL cannot be totally 
disconnected from emotions. This paper will therefore address the relationship between 
emotions and IHL, investigating whether a more humanized approach in IHL is desirable.3 In 
order to answer this question, this paper will discuss three main points of contact between 
IHL and emotions, more specifically from the perspective of the lawmakers (II), the fighting 
parties (III), and the victims of armed conflict (IV), before concluding that an affective turn in 
IHL is necessary at some levels, but not desirable at others (V). 
                                               
1
 A more nuanced discussion on the aims of ‘law’ can be found, for example, in H.L.A. HART, The concept of law, 
Third edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 333 p. 
2
 Mind however the famous quote by Lauterpacht: ‘If international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of 
law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.’ Hersch 
LAUTERPACHT, “The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War”, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 29, 
1952, p. 382.  
3 This paper was presented during a panel entitled ‘Emotional Warfare and its Limits: Towards an Affective Turn 
in International Humanitarian Law’ at the conference on ‘Historicising International (Humanitarian) Law? - Could 
we? Should we?’ at Uppsala University, 6-8 October 2016. They author would like to thank the participants for 
their feedback. 
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By way of preliminary remark, it should be noted that this paper approaches the topic 
‘emotions and IHL’ from a legal perspective and from that perspective only. It does not 
aspire to pronounce on emotions and warfare from any other point of view – for example, 
from a psychological, social, ethical or philosophical perspective – however interesting such 
approaches may be. Hence, ‘emotions’ in the context of this paper should be broadly 
understood as any ‘state of feeling’4, positive or negative, a human can have. Or, in other 
words, for the purpose of this paper, emotions mean the antipode of ratio, reason. That 
being said, we can now turn to the first point of contact between emotions and IHL: the 
creation of IHL. 
2. THE LAWMAKERS: INDIGNATION AND COMPASSION AS ORIGINS OF IHL 
 
Any IHL-specialist is familiar with the famous story of Henri Dunant (1828-1910), a Swiss 
businessman who was on his way to meet Napoleon III of France when he passed by 
Solferino, in June 1859, where the battle of Solferino was taking place between the 
Austrians and the Franco-Sardinians. Dunant, stationed in Castiglione della Pieve nearby 
Solferino, saw the many casualties of the battle of 24 June arriving in the town, while the 
military medical services were insufficiently prepared to offer adequate medical care. Upon 
his return to Geneva, Henri Dunant wrote his famous book “A memory of Solferino”, 
describing what he had witnessed during his trip. With an award-winning degree for drama 
and detail – a style not uncommon for writings of the 19th century –, Dunant described the 
Solferino battle and suffering of that day: 
On that memorable twenty-fourth of June, more than 300,000 men stood facing each 
other; the battle line was five leagues long, and the fighting continued for more than 
fifteen hours.5 
Here is a hand-to-hand struggle in all its horror and frightfulness; Austrian and Allies 
trampling each other under foot, killing one another on piles of bleeding corpses, 
felling their enemies with their rifle butts, crushing skulls, ripping bellies open with 
sabre and bayonet. No quarter is given; it is a sheer butchery; a struggle between 
savage beasts, maddened with blood and fury. Even the wounded fight to the last 
gasp. When they have no weapon left, they seize their enemies by the throat and 
tear them with their teeth. 
A little further on, it is the same picture, only made the more ghastly by the approach 
of a squadron of cavalry, which gallops by, crushing dead and dying beneath its 
horses’ hoofs. One poor wounded man has his jaw carried away; another his head 
shattered; a third, who could have been saved, has his chest beaten in. Oaths and 
shrieks of rage, groans of anguish and despair, mainly with the whinnying of the 
horses. 
Here come the artillery, following the cavalry, and going at full gallop. The guns crash 
over the dead and wounded, strewn pell-mell on the ground. Brains spurt under the 
wheels, limbs are broken and torn, bodies mutilated past recognition-the soil is 
literally puddled with blood, and the plain littered with human remains.6 
In addition to an elaborate description of the images Dunant saw, his account also shows the 
strong emotions felt during a battle like Solferino: 
                                               
4
 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/.  
5
 Henri DUNANT, Un souvernir de Solférino, Genève, 1862, reprinted by the ICRC, A Memory of Solferino, full text 
available at www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0361.pdf, p. 16. 
6
 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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The Austrian Emperor’s despair was terrible. He had borne himself like a hero; he 
had seen shot and shell raining around him all day long; and now he could not help 
weeping in the face of this disaster. In his distress, he threw himself into the path of 
the fleeing men, calling them cowards. When calm succeeded these outbursts of 
vehemence, he gazed in silence at the scene of desolation, with great tears 
streaming down his cheeks […].7  
The stillness of the night was broken by groans, by stifled sighs of anguish and 
suffering. Heart-rending voices kept calling for help. Who could ever describe the 
agonies of the fearful night! 8 
While the compassionate account of the facts undoubtedly distinguishes A Memory of 
Solferino from any dryly composed contemporary fact-finding report, the most crucial part of 
the book lies in the passages where Dunant describes the lack of medical care for the 
wounded after the battle.  
The first detachments of slightly wounded men were by this time beginning to reach 
Villafrance. After them came the more seriously injured, and all that sad night they 
kept on coming in droves. The doctors dressed their wounds, gave them a little 
nourishment and sent them in railway carriages to Verona, where the congestion 
became horrible. But though the Army, in its retreat, picked up all the wounded men it 
could carry in military wagons and requisitioned carts, how many unfortunate men 
were left behind, lying helpless on the naked ground in their own blood! […] How 
many silent tears were shed that miserable night when all false pride, all human 
decency even, were forgotten!9 
When the sun came up on the twenty-fifth, it disclosed the most dreadful sights 
imaginable. Bodies of men and horses covered the battlefield; corpses were strewn 
over roads, ditches, ravines, thickets and fields; the approaches of Solferino were 
literally thick with dead.10 
The crowding in Castiglione became something unspeakable. The town was 
completely transformed into a vast improvised hospital for French and Austrians. […] 
Straws had also been spread in the streets, courtyards and squares, and here and 
there wooden shelters had been thrown up or pieces of cloth stretched, so that the 
wounded pouring in from all directions might have a little shelter from the sun.11 
Having described the problem, Dunant continued by explaining how he felt witnessing all this 
suffering. The following passages show Dunant’s emotions, poetically portrayed:  
The feeling one has of one’s own utter inadequacy in such extraordinary and solemn 
circumstances is unspeakable. It is, indeed, excessively distressing to realize that 
you can never do more than help those who are just before you-that you must keep 
waiting men who are calling out and begging you to come. When you start to go 
somewhere, it is hours before you get there, for you are stopped by one begging for 
help, then by another, held up at every step by the crowd of poo wretches who press 
before and about you.12 
The moral sense of the importance of human life; the humane desire to lighten a little 
the torments of all these poor wretches, or restore their shattered courage; the 
                                               
7
 Ibid., p. 36 [emphasis added]. 
8
 Ibid., p. 41 [emphasis added]. 
9
 Ibid., p. 38 [emphasis added]. 
10
 Ibid., p 41. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
12
 Ibid., p. 72-3. 
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furious and relentless activity which a man summons up at such moments: all these 
combine to create a kind of energy which gives one a positive craving to relieve as 
many as one can. […] But then you feel sometimes that your heart is suddenly 
breaking-it is as if you were stricken all at once with a sense of bitter and irresistible 
sadness, because of some simple incident, some isolated happening, some small 
unexpected detail which strikes closer to the soul, seizing on our sympathies and 
shaking all the most sensitive fibres of our being.13 
Dunant subsequently proposed two solutions that would trigger the creation of National Red 
Cross Societies, the International Red Cross Committee and, most importantly for this paper, 
the adoption of IHL conventions. The following fragments would later proof to be world-
changing: 
Would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the 
purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and 
thoroughly qualified volunteers?14 
[W]ould it not be desirable […] to formulate some international principle, sanctioned 
by a Convention inviolate in character, which, once agreed upon and ratified, might 
constitute the basis for societies for the relief of the wounded in different European 
countries?15  
Upon his return to Geneva, Dunant contacted his Swiss friends and decided to convince 
European leaders at the time to create international rules governing the use of force during 
armed conflicts. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field was adopted by 12 States on 22 August 1864.16  
Dunant’s emotional account of the Solferino battle undoubtedly contributed to his success in 
convincing those leaders. It was, as stated by the ICRC introduction to the reprint of A 
Memory of Solferino, ‘an exhilarating experience for this young man who had come without 
warning from obscurity to touch the heart and stir the conscience of Europe.’17 This ‘stirring 
of the conscience of Europe’ would later result in the First Nobel Prize for Peace being 
granted to Dunant in 1901.  
What is important to remember from Henri Dunant’s story, is that the human feelings Dunant 
experienced in Solferino triggered him to mobilize politicians in favour of IHL codification. We 
do and cannot know how the codification of modern IHL would have otherwise happened – 
perhaps someone else’s indignation or compassion for the victims would have led to the 
same result. After Dunant’s initiative, States took the lead in the IHL codification process, by 
organizing diplomatic conferences which would lead to the adoption of other IHL treaties. 18 
The adoption of the four Geneva Conventions marked a second crucial moment in the 
codification of IHL. While the existing pre-war rules governed the way in which hostilities 
were held, the immense suffering of the civilian population, the prisoners of war and the 
soldiers during the Second World War brought to States to a point at which there were all 
willing to add more international obligations to the existing framework that regulated warfare. 
The significant and detailed amount of new rules enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
illustrates the ‘never again’- feeling of the international community at that time. In the current 
international political context, such conventions could probably not be adopted. While the 
                                               
13
 Ibid., p. 73-74. 
14
 Ibid., p. 115. 
15
 Ibid., p. 126. 
16
 By 1907 the Convention had 57 State parties. See ICRC, IHL Treaty database, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesHistoricalByDate.xsp.  
17
 Ibid., p. 9. 
18
 For example: the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 or the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field of 1906. 
7 
 
emotions of State leaders and their population were of course only one element that created 
this entire ‘humanitarian momentum’, they undoubtedly contributed to the willingness to 
codify old and new IHL-rules. The opening speech by the President of the ICRC of the Red 
Cross Conference in Stockholm, one of the conferences that led to the adoption of the 
Conventions, is telling for the general feeling of moral duty within the international 
community of the time:  
This is the first time an International Red Cross Conference has been held since the 
second World War, which in such a devastating manner ravaged both countries and 
peoples. It is only natural, therefore, that questions of exceedingly great importance 
will be dealt with here; questions which will have their importance for coming 
generations, whether, as we hope, countries and people are to live in peaceful 
relations, or mankind is once again to be compelled to endure the scourge of war. 
[…] The eyes of the whole humanitarian world are fixed on us with interest and 
anticipation. There is no need, ladies and gentlemen, to emphasize the very great 
responsibility that rests upon us. 
 
[…] We belong, so to speak, to one and the same family, though we may have 
diverse opinions, which in itself is no disadvantage, but only serves to increase our 
possibilities of getting the different questions illuminated and discussed. Despite any 
difference of views, I trust that our relations, both inside and outside the conference 
rooms, may bear the stamp of that friendship and comradeship that always unites the 
members of a good and happy family.19 
While the political context leading to the adoption of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions was different than the post-WWII environment, in essence those 
protocols again were adopted out of a sense that the existing legal framework was 
insufficient to counter the human suffering during war: after WWII the decolonization period 
started20, often followed by many years of civil wars, and many of those conflicts were not 
covered by the existing IHL framework, which focused on classic inter-State wars or 
international armed conflicts (IACs).21 The most humane solution would have been to adopt 
one single legal framework for both international and non-international armed conflicts 
(NIACs), as ‘victims in all situations of armed conflict, whatever their nature, are subject to 
the same suffering and should be helped in the same way’.22 This was however not the 
option States preferred. Instead, after consultation with experts, the ICRC proposed two 
separate but still quite similar texts to the diplomatic conference in 1973. 23 While initially it 
seemed that an elaborate text applicable in NIAC would be adopted, at the last minute 
States refused to agree with such a treaty. The reluctance to commit to the text had two 
reasons: ‘on the one hand, [States] did not believe that the draft provided sufficient 
guarantees for respect due to national sovereignty and for non-interference with internal 
affairs; on the other hand, some of the rules seemed to be too detailed to be realistic or to be 
able genuinely to be applied in the specific context of internal armed conflicts.’24 As a result, 
a much more limited text was approved for NIAC situations. Hence, the Additional Protocols 
                                               
19
 Opening Speech of ICRC President Bernadotte at the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference in 
Stockholm, 20 August 1948, printed in Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference, Stockholm, August 
1948, Report, p. 25. 
20
 Luc REDYAMS, ‘A la guerre comme à la guerre. Patterns of Armed Conflict over Time and How the Law 
Responded to Them’, in Jan WOUTERS, Philip DE MAN and Nele VERLINDEN (eds.), Armed Conflicts and the Law, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2016, pp. 12-16. 
21
 Except, of course, for common Art. 3 GCs.  
22
 See Yves SANDOZ, Christophe SWINARSKI and Bruno ZIMMERMAN (eds.), Commentary to the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, ICRC, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986, paras 4376. 
23
 Ibid., paras 4360-4418. 
24
 Ibid., para. 4412. 
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show that the feeling of compassion for the victims had its limits, and those limits were 
defined by an increasing sense of sovereign protectionism and skepticism about obligations 
imposed by international law.25 
As could already be felt during the 1977 negotiations for the Additional Protocols, in the 
decades after it became clear that traditional treaty making, based on a consensus between 
all States, proved no longer effective. Rather, the consensual method served as a ‘triple 
victory’ for those States who were against new IHL-rules: they could slow down the 
negotiation process, they could water down the text, and eventually they refused to sign or 
ratify the treaty anyway.26 While States still felt the moral duty to respond by new rules 
whenever a human tragedy occurred – the adoption of the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention after a chemical attack on civilians in northern Iraq in 1988 being one example 
thereof – States’ own national interests clearly outweighed the willingness to create more 
rules in favour of protection of victims. It is therefore not surprising that the adoption of the 
1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was preceded by a very intense civil 
society campaign.27 Local and regional meetings were organized by approximately 1200 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 60 different States. Despite States’ initial 
skepticism, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines triggered enough enthusiasm 
among a couple of States, including Canada.28 The NGO campaign therefore served as a 
modern Henri Dunant, successfully using testimonies of victims and constructing an 
emotional story in order to convince State leaders. The negotiation procedure that lead to 
the adoption of this Convention did not involve the traditional search for a consensus 
between all United Nations States. Instead, as new method was used – also referred to as 
‘Ottawa procedure’: only the States wishing to achieve a result were involved in the 
negotiations.29 Both the campaigning by the NGOs and the decision not to involve all States 
in the drafting of the text proved to be fruitful. One of the main reasons for this success was 
the ‘strength and simplicity of the humanitarian message backed by data about the numbers 
and devastating effects of landmines’.30 The role of the NGOs is explicitly acknowledged by 
the Preamble of the Convention, which reads as follows: 
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as 
evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the 
efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-
governmental organizations around the world […] 
Campaigning by NGOs also laid the foundation for the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court31 or the 2006 Dublin Convention against Cluster Munitions.32 
                                               
25
 As observed by Bugnion, ‘States generally resist any extension of rules designed to regulate matters which, in 
their opinion, fall under their exclusive jurisdiction, in particular if such rules are supposed to apply to situations 
where their sovereingty is challenged.’ François BUGNION, “Jus ad bellum, jus in bello and non-international 
armed conflicts”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 6, 2003, p. 191.  
26
 Yves SANDOZ, “Le demi-siècle des Conventions de Genève”, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 834, 
1999, p. 241. 
27
 For insights in the influence of the campaign on the negotiation of the Ottawa Convention, see Part I of 
Maxwell A. CAMERON, Brain TOMLIN and Bob LAWSON (eds.), To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban 
Landmines, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 491 p. 
28
 Alan BOYLE and Christine CHINKIN, The Making of international Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 
68-69. 
29
 M. SASSÒLI, A. BOUVIER and A. QUINTIN, How does law protect in war?, 3rd edition, Geneva, ICRC, 2011, p. 
150. 
30
 BOYLE and CHINKIN, supra note 28, p. 69. 
31
 BOYLE and CHINKIN, supra note 28, pp. 71-74. 
32
 Needless to say that NGO campaigns have also been involved in the development of human rights treaties, 
such as the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, see C. COHEN, ‘The role of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in the Drafting of the Convention of the Rights of the Child’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 12, 
1990, 137-147. 
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The latest codification of international law with a link to IHL was the recent adoption of the 
UN Arms Trade Treaty in 2013, which was preceded by almost 20 years of NGO 
campaigning.33 Currently another NGO campaign aims for an international ban on 
autonomous weapon systems.34 
While these successes are of course a positive sign for NGOs, they also tell us something 
about the readiness of States to create new IHL treaties. It seems that States’ willingness to 
act out of a particular emotions triggered by certain events has decreased in comparison 
with the previous century. States think twice before supporting the adoption of new 
international obligations. A stagnation in the codification of international law does of course 
not mean that international law cannot develop further: the steady development of customary 
IHL35, as well as the adoption of best practices and soft law documents36 shows that the 
need for IHL rules that are adapted to the current type of warfare can be fulfilled in other 
ways. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that civil society organizations have to put so much 
effort in convincing States to set aside their own national interests for the sake of a better 
protection of victims of armed conflict. Therefore, from a lawmakers’ perspective, there is 
indeed perhaps need for a more a more humanized approach towards the creation of new 
IHL rules.   
3. THE FIGHTING PARTIES: DEACTIVATION OF EMOTIONS 
 
Paradoxically, while emotions triggered the creation of IHL, the same body of law tries to 
‘deactivate’ the emotions of fighting soldiers. Indeed, IHL imposes obligations on fighting 
parties to protect certain persons, despite the (negative) feelings the soldiers on the ground 
might have vis-à-vis those persons. It is a given fact that belonging to a certain group, 
whether it is an official State army or a non-State armed group, makes the killing of a person 
belonging to another group easier to accept.37 In other words, ‘social identity’, which can be 
defined as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a group together with the value and emotional significance attached to the 
membership’38, facilitates killing of persons who do not belong to that identity. Hence one of 
the underlying goals of IHL rules: they prohibit behavior combatants might otherwise, 
because they belong to a group, be inclined to do towards their victims.  
This mechanism of ‘deactivation of emotions’ can be found in numerous IHL provisions. For 
instance, while a soldier would prefer to kill prisoners of war out of revenge, this is clearly 
prohibited by Art. 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (GC III). Similarly, soldiers who 
surrender or who are hors de combat, may not be killed (Article 41 AP I). Multiple protective 
provisions also exist for civilians, the most obvious rule being the principle of distinction 
                                               
33
 For a ‘lessons learned’ analysis of this campaign, see Roy ISBISTER and Kloé TRICOT O'FARRELL, “Lessons 
learned: How NGOs contributed to the ATT success”, Per la pau/Peace in progress, Issue 16, 2013, www.icip-
perlapau.cat/e-review/issue-16-may-2013/lessons-learned-how-ngos-contributed-att-success.htm.  
34
 This campaign is called ‘Stop Killer Robots’, see www.stopkillerrobots.org/.  
35
 See the authoritative Study on Customary IHL Rules carried out by the ICRC: Jean-Marie HENCKAERTS and 
Louise DOSWALD-BECK, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules, Geneva, ICRC and 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, 628 p.  
36
 For example, the Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States 
related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict of 2009. The development 
of best practices might also be the (perhaps only possible) outcome of the consultation process among States, 
held by the ICRC, in order to strengthen the rules applicable to detention in non-international armed conflicts. 
See www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/other-activities/development-ihl/strengthening-legal-protection-ihl-
detention.htm.  
37
 For a full study of this phenomenon, see Emanuele CASTANO, Berhard LEIDNER and Patricia SLATUWA, “Social 
identification Processes, Group Dynamics and the Behaviour of Combatants”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 90., No. 870, 2008, pp. 259-271. 
38
 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 
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enshrined in Article 48 AP I. The bulk of rules enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(GC IV) envisages the protection of ‘enemy civilians’ in particular.39 Similar protective 
provisions for specific categories of persons (for instance Article 50 GV IV on the protection 
of children) strive to neutralize the emotions of the warring parties to the benefit of the 
victims of the conflict. However, reality reveals that international rules prohibiting certain 
conduct cannot prevent that conduct from being committed. After all, fighting persons are 
human beings with feelings of anxiety, anger, and revenge, which can influence their 
behavior during an armed conflict. This raises the question whether victims of armed conflict 
would be better off if faced with a robot, which does not have such feelings. This question 
brings us to the highly debated issue of autonomous weapon systems.  
There is no internationally agreed definition of autonomous weapon systems. One possible 
definition defines them as ‘weapons that can independently select and attack targets’, 
meaning they are autonomous with regard to the ‘critical functions of acquiring, tracking 
selecting and attacking targets’.40 Their development is fairly recent and still ongoing. 
Already used to a certain extent (for example, defensive weapon systems which can attack 
an incoming missile), their use is expected to grow increasingly in the next years. Fully 
autonomous weapon systems do not yet exist.41 But while their technical development is still 
under investigation, the (possible) use of autonomous weapons raises a number of very 
important legal and ethical questions. An important aspect of the debate is the influence of 
emotions on combatants’ behavior and how this aversely – or not – impacts the respect for 
IHL rules.  
 
Despite the extensive body of rules which should protect victims of armed conflicts, still very 
often those rules are violated. Many perpetrators of war crimes are in some way influenced 
by their emotions at the time of the crime. The influence of emotions on the occurrence of 
war crimes is illustrated by Arkin’s lists of some possible reasons for the commission of IHL 
violations: ‘high friendly losses leading to a tendency to seek revenge’, ’dehumanization of 
the enemy through the use of derogatory names and epithets’, ‘external pressure, e.g. for a 
need to produce a high body count of the enemy’ and ‘pleasure from the power of killing or 
an overwhelming sense of frustration’.42 In other words, as Walzer aptly puts it, ‘[f]ear and 
hysteria are always latent in combat, often real, and they press us toward fearful measures 
and criminal behaviour.’43 Since autonomous weapons, as opposed to humans, would not 
suffer from this ‘fear and hysteria’ which is intrinsic to warfare, the absence of emotions in 
the case of robots could be advanced as an argument to advocate for their use. Autonomous 
weapons can be designed without ‘emotions that cloud their judgment or result in anger and 
frustration with ongoing battlefield events.’44 
 
In addition, a phenomenon called ‘scenario fulfillment’ would be avoidable when using 
autonomous systems.45 This phenomenon entails that humans process incoming behavior in 
accordance with their pre-existing believe patterns. Hence, a person under stress will have a 
‘tunnel vision’, enabling him only to act according the scenario he had in mind. ‘Robots’, 
                                               
39
 See the nationality criterion imposed by Article 4 GC IV: ‘Persons protected by the Convention are those who 
at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves […] in the hands of a Party to the conflict […] 
of which they are not nationals.’ Note however in case-law having an enemy ‘allegiance’ rather than nationality 
also brings a person in the protective scope of GC IV. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A 
(Appeals Chamber), Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 166. 
40
 ICRC, Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on “Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”, 26 to 28 March 2014, Geneva, 2014, p. 5. 
41
 Ibid., 7. 
42
 Summary of presentation by Ronald ARKIN, see Ibid., 33 [emphasis added]. 
43
 Michael WALZER, Jus and unjust wars. A moral argument with historical illustrations, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1978, p. 251.  
44
 Summary of presentation by Ronald ARKIN, see ICRC, Autonomous Weapons Report, supra note 40, p. 35. 
45
 Ibid.  
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according to Arkin, ‘need not be vulnerable to such patterns of premature cognitive 
disclosure’.46  
 
On the other hand, the fact that autonomous weapon systems lack human emotions might 
not always be in favour of the protection of the (possible) victims of armed conflict. According 
to Human Rights Watch, it would not be possible to ‘duplicate’ the psychological processes 
that humans use in order to assess whether an attack is proportionate or not.47 Therefore, as 
Schmitt acknowledges, the use of autonomous weapons systems ‘would need to be limited 
to cases where the risk to civilians is minimal.’48 
 
The debate on the acceptability of autonomous weapon systems is obviously much broader 
than the sole issue whether robots might be a tool to overcome failures caused by human 
emotions in warfare. Nevertheless, the fact that this überhaupt is an issue of debate 
illustrates the connection between the emotions of those who fight and their respect for IHL 
rules. As some IHL rules envisage to ‘deactivate’ emotions of combatants, there might 
indeed be a case for the use of autonomous weapon systems. On the other hand, it is 
argued that the respect of other IHL rules, would precisely require more ‘human’ insight into 
a particular situation. This brings us to the third perspective on points of contact between 
emotions and IHL: that of the victims. 
4. THE VICTIMS: DOES THEIR EMOTIONAL SUFFERING COUNT? 
  
The suffering of victims of armed conflict, at Dunant’s time primarily the suffering of wounded 
soldiers, but later on also the suffering of captured combatants and eventually also the 
suffering of civilians, has always been a core concern of IHL rules. Nevertheless, a concern 
for emotional suffering is only partially reflected throughout all IHL-provisions. While multiple 
provisions on the protection of persons who find themselves in the power of the enemy do 
take into account possible non-physical suffering, the articles on the conduct of hostilities 
only occasionally contain specific references to such suffering. 
 
A person can end up in enemy hands in various ways: a combatant can be wounded and 
hospitalized in an enemy hospital, he or she can be captured, a civilian can be interned, or 
simply belong to the population of an occupied territory. At a time where measuring mental 
well-being was even not yet taken seriously in the medical sphere49, the negotiators of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols did think of ‘emotional 
suffering’50 and the psychological well-being of persons in the hands of the enemy during 
armed conflict. Even before the 1949 negotiations a separate title was already devoted to 
‘Intellectual and moral needs of prisoners of war’ by the 1929 Convention on Prisoners of 
                                               
46
 Ibid.  
47
 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, November 2012, 
www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots. On the principle of proportionality and 
the damage to civilians, see Part III of this paper. 
48
 ICRC, Autonomous Weapons Report, supra note 40, p. 83. 
49
 Mental harm as a tangible concept has only been developed in the decades after the adoption of the 1977 
Additional Protocols. See E. LIEBLICH, “Beyond Life and Limb: Exploring Incidental Mental Harm Under 
International Humanitarian Law” in D. JINKS, J.N. MAOGOTO and S. SOLOMON (eds.), Applying International 
Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014, p. 203. 
50
 ‘Emotional suffering’ is only one way of referring to the non-physical suffering of victims. Other notions that are 
used are ‘psychological’, ‘mental’ or ‘moral’ ‘suffering’ or ‘injury’. As a jurist I leave it up to the psychologist and 
philosophers to determine whether there is any difference between those terms. For the purpose of this paper, 
emotional, moral, mental and psychological suffering/injury shall be considered synonymous (even though the 
Geneva Conventions sometimes refer to moral well-being in a religious rather than an emotional context, see for 
instance Article 80 GC III and Article 103 GC IV, which use ‘bien-être moral’ in the French version and ‘spiritual 
well-being’ in the English version).  
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War51, which became a Chapter on ‘religious, intellectual and physical activities’ under GC 
III. In the 1949 Conventions and their Protocols, various specific rules protect the emotional 
well-being of persons concerned prisoners of war (enshrined in GC III) or civilians under the 
power of the enemy (enshrined in GC IV).52 For instance, the exercise of moral coercion on 
Prisoners of War is prohibited by Article 17 § 3 and 99 GC III, and on civilians by Article 31 
GC IV.53  The mental health and integrity of persons in the power of the enemy shall not be 
endangered (Article 11 AP I and Article 5, 2, e AP II). Objects with ‘sentimental value’ may 
not be taken from prisoners or interned civilians (Article 18 GC III and Article 97 GC IV). 
Prisoners of War may under certain conditions be compelled to carry out labor in order to 
‘maintain their mental health’ (Article 49 GC III). When organizing hospital services in 
occupied territory, the Occupying Power has to take into account the ‘moral susceptibilities’ 
of the population (Article 56 GC IV). Disciplinary regimes in internment facilities for civilians 
may not involve ‘moral victimization’ (Article 100 GC IV). In addition, Article 18 GC I obliged 
the Occupying Power to provide the wounded and sick with ‘moral care’ and collective 
penalties or measures of ‘intimidation or of terrorism’ against the occupied population are 
prohibited (Article 33 GC IV). 
 
More generally, the many rules prohibiting torture, cruel or inhuman treatment protect victims 
of armed conflict from all sorts of severe suffering, including psychological: Article 3 common 
GCs prohibits ‘cruel treatment’, ‘torture’ and ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ of persons hors 
de combat. Specific provisions in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols prohibit 
the same conduct in various scenarios.54 While not every provision explicitly mentions 
‘mental suffering’, it is unquestioned that torture, cruel and inhuman treatment include acts 
which inflict serious or severe mental pain or suffering.55  
 
While the emotional impact of certain behavior on victims who are in the power of their 
enemy is taken care of by certain IHL provisions, the emotional impact of hostilities is only to 
a limited extent taken into account. For instance, Article 4, §2, a AP II prohibits ‘violence […] 
to the mental well-being of persons’, while paragraph 1 of the same Article stipulates it 
applies to ‘all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted’. While this could be interpreted as 
protecting the mental well-being of persons during the conduct of hostilities in a NIAC, the 
fact that this Article ‘reiterates’, ‘supplements’ and ‘reinforces’ common Article 3 GCs does 
not favor such an interpretation. Indeed, the latter Article is generally understood as not 
including any conduct of hostilities rules.56  
                                               
51
 See Chapter IV of the Convention on Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929. 
52
 According to Annex I to GC III, Prisoners of War suffering from a serious mental disease are entitled to 
immediate repatriation (see Annex I, Part I, A, 2, g and Part II, 2). See also Articles 30 GC III and 91 GC IV, 
which foresees ‘isolation wards’ for persons suffering from mental disease (whether this is really protecting the 
persons in question is another matter). 
53
 The provision reads: ‘No psychical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on 
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.’ [emphasis added] 
54
 Art. 12, § 2 GC I (‘torture’), Art. 12 § 2 GC II (‘torture’), Art. 17 § 4 GC III (‘physical or mental torture’), Art. 87 § 
3 GC III (‘torture or cruelty’), Art. 89 GC III (‘inhuman, brutal or dangerous’ disciplinary punishment), Art. 32 GC IV 
(‘torture’ and ‘other measures of brutality’), Art. 75 § 2 AP I (torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental), Art. 4 
§ 2 AP II (‘violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being’) [emphasis added]. 
55
 The ICTY defines inhuman treatment as ‘an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged 
objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or 
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity’. See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, 
Case No. IT-98-34-T (Trial Chamber) 31 March 2003, para. 246 For torture the threshold is ‘severe’ rather than 
‘serious’ suffering: ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23&IT-96/23/1-A (Appeals 
Chamber) 1 June 2002, para. 149.  
56
 With the exception, perhaps, of the prohibition of murder. See 2016 ICRC Commentary to the First Geneva 
Convention, §540: Common Article 3 does not address the conduct of hostilities. The substantive protections in 
common Article 3 themselves, for example the prohibitions on torture and hostage-taking, envision a certain level 
of control over the persons concerned: they are in the power of a Party to the conflict. This includes civilians living 
in areas under the control of a Party to the conflict but not with respect to actions by Parties governed by the 
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A clearer prohibition related to the conduct of hostilities can be found in Article 51 § 2 AP I 
and Article 13 § 2 AP II, which prohibit ‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited’. This prohibition of 
intentionally inflicting emotional harm (to ‘terrorize’ the population) is uncontested. It ‘can be 
viewed as the first major provision in IHL to explicitly prohibit acts intended to inflict mental 
harm.’57 Nevertheless, the scope of this prohibition is limited to terror intentionally which is 
inflicted upon the civilian population. According to the travaux préparatoires, it ‘excludes 
terror which was not intended by a belligerent and terror that is merely an incidental effect of 
acts of warfare which have another primary object and are in all other respects lawful.’58 As a 
result, psychological trauma as a side-effect of attacks is hanging in a ‘legal limbo.’59 
Nevertheless, besides the prohibition to use terror as a method of warfare60, the absence of 
specific references to emotional or psychological damage due to attacks does not mean 
such damage should automatically be ignored when assessing the legality of a particular 
attack: mental suffering definitely is to be included into the evaluation of ‘superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering’ and arguably also in the proportionality test imposed by IHL.  
Firstly, even though emotions are not explicitly mentioned in the basic rule which prohibits 
the employment of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to 
cause ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’ (Article 35 § 2 AP I) 61, emotional 
suffering is implicitly included therein. During the negotiations it was made clear that the 
notion of ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’ was the preferred translation for the 
French notion of maux superflus, ‘which includes both physical and moral injury’.62 This 
broad interpretation is not contested by doctrine. According to Oeter, the ‘traditional notion of 
‘unnecessary suffering’ means […] a physical or emotional impairment which cannot be 
justified by military necessity.’63 Gardam notes that [t]he factors that fall to be considered in 
                                                                                                                                                  
rules on the conduct of hostilities. This reading finds support in the preparatory work for the Geneva Conventions 
and in military manuals and case law. It is also supported in academic literature. [footnotes omitted]. 
57
 LIEBLICH, supra note 49, p. 196. 
58
 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, Vol. VX, CDDH/215/Rev.1, p. 274, para. 
51. 
59
 LIEBLICH, supra note 49, p. 186. 
60
 Remarkably, on one instance during the negotiation of the Additional Protocols, the emotions of victims were 
used as an argument not to rule out the use of a certain weapon. Indeed, when the issue of napalm was 
discussed, one expert listed the advantages of the use of napalm as follows: possibility for the aircraft to attack at 
a low altitude, under adverse weather conditions, and without running the risk of being accidentally hit by the 
bombs; possibility to drop the bombs close to friendly troops; possible use for battlefield illumination; 
psychological effect both on enemy and friendly troops.’ See ICRC, Report of the Conference of Government 
Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (Lugano, 28 January – 26 September 1976), Geneva, 
1976, p. 111. No specific prohibition to use napalm was included in the APs, but the use of incendiary weapons 
against the civilian population is now prohibited by the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
Geneva, 10 October 1980. 
61
 The same article also contains a prohibition to use methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may 
be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment (Art. 35 § 3 AP I). 
On this prohibition, the Commentary rather vaguely notes that ‘[p]reventative or corrective measures have to be 
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SANDOZ, SWINARSKI and ZIMMERMAN, supra note 22, para. 1142. 
62
 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, supra note 58, p. 267, para. 21 [emphasis added]. 
Nevertheless, during the negotiation of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, at least one other expert 
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slight, could entail severe psychological harm.’ See ICRC, Report of the Conference of Government Experts on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (Lucerne 24 September – 18 October 1974), Geneva, 1975, p. 8. 
63
 Stefan OETER, “Means and Methods of Warfare”, in Dieter FLECK (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in 
Armed Conflicts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 115. 
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the equation in terms of suffering or injury encompass both the physical and psychological 
effects of weapons, […].’64  
Despite this agreement, the notion of ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’ remains 
rather vague and difficult to apply when assessing the legality of weapons. This is why the 
ICRC undertook the so-called SIrUS-project (by reference to the commonly used 
abbreviation of ‘serious injury or unnecessary suffering’), the results of which were published 
in 1997.65 The SIrUS project comprised a group of experts who elaborated four objective 
criteria to determine what constitutes ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’. While all 
criteria refer to physical consequences of attacks, one of them (labelled ‘Criterion I’) includes 
a reference to mental suffering: it determines that serious injury or unnecessary suffering 
occurs when a weapon has designed-dependent, foreseeable effects which cause ‘specific 
disease, specific abnormal physiological state, specific abnormal psychological state, 
specific and permanent disability or specific disfigurement’66 [emphasis added]. Obviously 
the crucial element here is whether or not a psychological state is ‘specific’ and ‘abnormal’. 
Indeed, the authors of the study note that ‘[w]hilst all weapons produce fear and stress, 
these reactions are neither specific nor abnormal.’67 Hence, in overly medical language, the 
SIrUS Project explains that  
Criterion I would apply to a weapon designed to disorientate, confuse, induce calm or 
precipitate seizures or psychosis. In the same context, the known neuroendocrine 
response to physical trauma from conventional weapons is part of their effects. The 
same neuroendocrine response produced by an agent or energy form without 
physical injury would represent a specific and abnormal physiological response.68  
Secondly, there are some good arguments to include mental harm into the IHL 
proportionality assessment as enshrined in Articles 51 § 5, b and 57 § 2, 2 AP I. These 
provisions prohibit attacks  
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.  
The proportionality test requires a balancing exercise between two types of information: on 
the one hand, the loss of civilians, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects which can 
reasonably be expected from the attack, and on the other hand, the concrete and military 
advantage which can be anticipated. Proportionality thus implies a double future-looking 
assessment. 
While the ordinary meaning of ‘injury to civilians’ would be that it only covers physical harm, 
it has been argued that it is not unreasonable to also extend its meaning to psychological 
harm.69 When defining the notion ‘cyber attack’, the Tallinn Manual explains that ‘[w]hile the 
notion of attack extends to injuries and death caused to individuals, it is, in light of the law of 
armed conflict’s underlying purposes, reasonable to extend the definition to serious illness 
and severe mental suffering that are tantamount to injury.’70 Thus, the argument goes, by 
way of teleological interpretation, serious mental suffering as a consequence of an attack 
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and comparative law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 69. 
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70
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should be taken into account when assessing the legality of that attack. Gisel, legal adviser 
of the ICRC, ‘tend[s] to agree’ with that interpretation.71  
Nevertheless, including mental harm in the proportionality assessment is not an obvious 
reading of ‘injury to civilians’. State practice on mental suffering in proportionality is scarce. 
When discussing the proportionality rule, military manuals and national legislation do not 
explicitly refer to ‘mental harm’ or any alternative term72, even though the occasional use of 
wider terms – such as by the Canadian Military Manual which refers to ‘adverse effect upon 
civilians’73 – possibly point at the inclusion of mental harm. On the other hand, the 2005 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, adopted by the UN General Assembly and thus by States worldwide, 
requires that ‘compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage 
[…] such as physical or mental harm’74. However, since these rules also concern human 
rights violations, they do not provide conclusive evidence for mental harm being part of the 
proportionality rule under IHL.  
Even if there would be a customary rule including psychological harm into the proportionality 
assessment, practical problems might hamper an effective implementation of this wider rule: 
how can mental harm be measured and, a for a proportionality assessment crucial question, 
be foreseen? True, psychologists have over the last decades identified detailed benchmarks 
to diagnose mental suffering.75 It is also a fact that it is even for bodily harm difficult to make 
predictions when planning a certain attack. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that including 
mental harm would add a layer of complexity in the obligations that military advisers have to 
fulfil.  
It should also be noted that expanding the proportionality test to mental harm which is not 
intentionally inflicted would not bring all mental suffering into the IHL-picture. Indeed, the so-
called ‘anticipatory anxiety’ caused by the use of drones would not fall under the 
proportionality assessment.76 More in general, all the emotional problems caused by the 
simple fact of living in a war zone77 cannot be avoided by imposing military to take mental 
suffering into account when assessing whether the expected civilian injury is excessive to 
the anticipated military advantage of a specific attack. General emotional suffering caused 
by armed conflict is not prohibited by IHL rules. At first sight this might seem contradictory to 
the general humanitarian purpose of IHL, which is to alleviate suffering of victims of armed 
conflict. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that humanity is only one side of the ‘IHL- 
medal’, military necessity being the other one. While a universal ban on armed conflicts 
(international and non-international) would – if respected – indeed avoid mental suffering 
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caused by conflict in general, such ban is not the purpose of IHL rules, which accept armed 
conflict as a reality.78  
In sum, mental well-being of persons who find themselves in the power of the enemy is 
taken care of by IHL provisions. With regard to the conduct of hostilities, the prohibition to 
use terror against the civilian population is the only rule which explicitly refers to emotions. 
Nevertheless, mental suffering is also included in the prohibition to use methods of warfare 
which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Incidental mental suffering, on the 
other hand, can only be read in the proportionality assessment through a teleological 
interpretation: since the goal of IHL-rules is to prevent victims from suffering in armed 
conflict, it would indeed seem advisable to take a ‘humanized’ approach and include 
psychological harm in a proportionality assessment. Unfortunately, however, State practice 
does not yet take this point of view. This can perhaps be explained ‘mainly due to lack of 
awareness or lack of interest. After all, mental harm does not result in immediate clips of 
carnage uploaded to YouTube – and is thus much easier to underestimate or to disregard 
altogether.”79 
5. CONCLUSION: TO FEEL OR NOT TO FEEL?  
 
As this brief analysis of three different contact points between emotions and IHL shows, the 
relationship between the two is not straightforward.  
From the perspective of IHL lawmakers, the emotions of Henri Dunant served as the 
triggering point for IHL codification. While States initially had the same humanity-driven 
codification reflex in reaction to key evolutions in warfare, their willingness to create new IHL 
obligations has decreased in the last decades. Today NGOs serve as a modern Henri 
Dunant, trying to convince States of the need for additional regulation in warfare. When it 
comes to lawmaking, a more humanized stance of States therefore seems necessary. 
From the perspective of the fighting parties, IHL contains rules which aim at deactivating 
negative emotions in favour of the protection of victims of armed conflict. In the current 
debate on autonomous weapon systems, their capacity to act without emotions is used as 
an argument to defend their utility. That same feature is also used by the opponents of 
autonomous weapon systems, who argue that in some instances victims would suffer even 
more if no humans are involved when an attack is carried out. The debate on the relationship 
between emotions and the fighting parties, and the extent to which international law should 
allow for or prohibit autonomous weapons systems, is far from being settled.  
From the perspective of victims of armed conflict, their emotional suffering is not fully taken 
into account by IHL rules. While the infliction of serious or severe mental suffering is 
prohibited by numerous provisions in scenarios whereby a victim is in the power of the 
enemy, in the conduct of hostilities the only explicit and uncontested prohibition is the use of 
terror as a method of warfare. If a certain means or method of warfare deliberately inflicts a 
specific and abnormal psychological state, this would nevertheless be prohibited by the rule 
which rules out superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. In contrast, mental suffering as 
a side-effect of attacks is only prohibited if one interprets the proportionality rule in a 
teleological way. Here again, a more humanized approach seems welcome. 
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